![]() Reconnaissance platforms must be able to operate in all spheres: ground, surface, below surface, air, space, naval, and littoral areas. While the OPFOR practices similar intelligence and reconnaissance disciplines (HUMINT, SIGNINT, IMINT, etc.) as the US, the OPFOR conducts RISTA with different assets, focuses, and methodologies. Prior to hostilities, the OPFOR will already have developed an intelligence picture and expected military courses of actions. The OPFOR commits significant resources to reconnaissance. For information on OPFOR command and control (C2), see Chapter 9. Therefore, RISTA DOES NOT equal the US term, C4ISR (command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). The OPFOR term that addresses the totality of reconnaissance activities is RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition). Poor reconnaissance can lead directly to failure. Aggressive, continuous reconnaissance allows the timely accomplishment of combat missions with minimum losses. Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organizing, collecting, and studying information on the enemy, terrain, and weather in the area of operation. 12.5.3 Properties of Selected Biological Agents.12.5.2 Types and Characteristics Chemical Agents.12.5.1 Types and Characteristics Chemical Agents.12.5 Subcategories of agents as the following:.12.3 The Effects of CBRN on the Battlefield.12 Chapter 12: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons.10.5.4 OPFOR Capabilities: Near- And Mid-Term.10.5.3 OPFOR Capabilities: Near-Term And Mid-Term.10.5.2 Technologies And Applications For Use By OPFOR: Near And Mid- Term.10.5.1 Considerations in Determining Emerging OPFOR Technologies by Time Frame.10.5 OPFOR Technologies And Emerging Operational Environments.10.3.3 OPFOR Reconnaissance And Assault Vehicle Upgrades.10.3.2 OPFOR Light Armored Vehicle Upgrades.10.2.3 Countermeasures By Functional Area And Type System.10.2.2 Countermeasures Against Weapons and Weapon Sensors.10.2 Lethality Component versus Countermeasure Responses.10 Chapter 10: Countermeasures, Upgrades, and Emerging Technology.9.2.1 Table 5: Tactical Electronic Warfare Systems.9.1.2 Table 2: Communication Satellites.9.1.1 Table 1: Tactical Communications Systems.7.4 Man-Portable Rocket Propelled Line Charges.7.2 Explosive Charge Minefield Breaching Systems.7.1.3 3. Emplacement or Delivery Methods.6.1 Artillery Weapons: Rocket Launchers.5.5 Recoilless Weapons for Modern Warfare.5.4.2.8 Future Developments in KE Attack.5.4.2.6 Tanks and heavy armored combat vehicles (HACVs).5.4.2.4 Guns for light vehicle applications (7.62 mm to 23 mm).5.4.2.3 Weapons for dismounted infantry.5.4.2 Kinetic Energy Threats to Light Armored Vehicles.5.4.1.7 Vehicle considerations which translate directly into either tactical strengths or weakness.5.4.1.6 Enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.5.4.1.3 RISTA (UAV/UCAV, Robotic radars and camera, UGS, Manned FOs, and SOF).5.4.1 Enemy exploitation of tactical vehicle mobility limitations.5.3 Multi-Role (MR) and Anti-Armor Weapons and Munitions to Counter Armored Vehicles.5.2 Spectrum of Weapons and Munitions Effective Against Armored Vehicles.5.1 Antitank and Anti-Armor Systems: Key Technology Trends.5 Chapter 5: Anti-tank and Anti-Armor Systems.1.3 Sensor Technologies for Tactical Ground Forces. ![]()
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